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Abstract 
 
Analysing a sample of business units from the PIMS data bank of North American companies we 
are able to extract data on investment hurdle rates, thus accessing a variable that is rarely 
observable. The text-book story maintains that firms should invest only if the return exceeds the 
cost of funds. Several theories however, explain the use of investment hurdle rates that differ 
from discount rates. We find that hurdle rates are frequently below and also frequently above 
matched data on discount rates. In a statistical analysis we find that this behaviour can be 
explained by a combination of agency theory and real options theory. We take this as important 
evidence that a full explanation of capital investment cannot be accomplished without a 
consideration of behavioural and strategic influences. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Increasingly, companies are becoming polarized into two camps: those 
who consider shareholder value the key to managing the company and 
those who put their faith in gaining competitive advantage. At companies 
across the United States there is an intense struggle taking place between 
those who formulate business strategy and those who seek to value it” 
 
Alfred Rappaport, Harvard Business Review, May-June 1992 
 
The dichotomy identified in Rappaport’s observation reflected a contemporary debate as to 
whether underinvestment in US industry was fuelled by an excessive use of formal methods of 
investment appraisal. Such methods were said to result in companies underestimating the wider 
strategic benefits of investment so that projects had to be justified to company boards by “faith 
alone” (Kaplan 1986). Across countries too, differences in financial institutions between Anglo-
US and German-Japanese varieties of capitalism were argued to map onto corporate time 
horizons and to explain contrasting investment rates (National Research Council 1994). 1 
 
 By contrast, others cautioned that lax controls on investment spending were allowing 
management too much autonomy from Board control. By this account, excessive investment 
was resulting in an overhang of excess capacity that could profitably be eliminated by tighter 
monitoring, incentive alignment, or devices such as higher leverage rates which, by reducing 
free cash flow, would limit the scope of individual managers to pursue rent-seeking activities 
(Jensen 1986, 1993) 
 
The subsequent development and popularization of Real Options theory (Dixit and Pindyck 
1994) provided a new set of tools for the examination of the issues, providing a justification for 
hurdle rates lying either below or above the cost of capital. In cases where investment created 
new knowledge or because the investment created a follow-on option (Brealey and Myers 2003; 
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 More recently this idea has been pursued in Allen and Gale (2000) and Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) 
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Schwartz and Trigeorgis 2001), we may observe hurdle rates below the cost of capital. At the 
same time Real Options theory also provided a justification for hurdle rates higher than the cost 
of capital in the context of irreversible investment under uncertainty. An illustrative case 
developed by Dixit and Pindyck results in a hurdle rate twice the discount rate; Wambach (2000) 
computes a premium of about 5% for a range of typical investments, while several other authors 
have found a premium that depends on industrial characteristics (Ghosal and Loungani 2000, 
Driver et al 2006).   
 
In this paper we aim to establish whether the heterogeneity noted by Rappaport finds support in 
data on investment hurdle rates used in the private sector. If, as suggested, companies are 
polarised into shareholder oriented businesses (strong financial discipline) and those with 
managerial autonomy (lax financial discipline), we should expect to see this reflected in 
investment appraisal and specifically in the ‘wedge’ reported in our data between discount rates 
and hurdle rates. An important question is then whether this heterogeneity, if it occurs, can be 
explained by Real Options or other theoretical arguments. In what follows we present an 
analysis of hurdle rates using the PIMS (Profit Impact of Marketing Strategy) dataset of large 
industrial firms, mostly US based. We find that there is substantial evidence of heterogeneity in 
the manner in which companies appraise investment opportunities and that the differences 
across companies can be explained to some extent by established theories. 
  
There have been surprisingly few direct studies of hurdle rates in capital budgeting, despite the 
wealth of theorizing on the topic. One reason for this neglect may be that hurdle rates are 
generally unrecorded and have to be found by surveys of company managers, so that consistent 
observation over time is difficult and reported studies are rare. One exception was a survey (of 
the Fortune 1000 companies) which used a set of reported hurdle rates in manufacturing 
industry for a particular year and which attempted to explain the considerable variation across 
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the sample (Poterba and Summers 1995).2 However, despite entering a large range of financial 
and structural variables the authors failed to obtain any results that explained the diversity in 
hurdle rates and that accorded with prior theory. The one partial exception was that the current 
ratio (a possible proxy for free cash flow) was found - in a bi-variate regression - to be correlated 
with higher hurdle rates.3 The authors report the “striking conclusion…that none of the traditional 
financial variables that might proxy for risk, like the firm’s stock market Beta, correlates with 
hurdle rates” (p.47). But if risk is not the major determinant of differences in hurdle rates, what 
is? As noted above,  explanations for the observation of hurdle rates higher than the cost of 
capital is a real-options irreversibility premium (Jagannathan and Meier 2002). Hurdle rates 
lower than the cost of capital may be explained, as noted above either by lax control and a 
desire for empire building, or alternatively, by strategic use of follow-on options. 
 
In this paper we use a range of variables to discriminate between the cases where the hurdle 
rate of a business unit is above or below its discount rate. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
background and establishes some hypotheses for the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes 
the nature of the dataset we are using. We then describe the testing framework in section 4, with 
results presented in Section 5.  
 
 
2. Why do hurdle rates differ from discount rates? 
 
In the standard literature on economics and finance, capital investment is pushed to the point 
where net marginal returns just equal the cost of funds. The presence or not of a premium 
                                                           
2
 Most companies in the sample appeared to use a real hurdle rate much higher than the real cost of capital. Indeed, 
typically, the hurdle rate was more than 3 percentage points above the real cost of equity but it was both much higher 
for some companies and it was negative for a substantial proportion – about a quarter of the total. 
3
 A further bi-variate regression suggested that managers with financial backgrounds may be more inclined towards 
higher hurdle rates though the direction of causation here is somewhat unclear. 
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payment for external finance does not alter that condition, although a hard financial constraint 
might imply that the return on the marginal project return exceeds the notional cost of funds.4 
Usually, however, and especially for large firms that are representative of our sample, financial 
constraints are not hard and relate instead to the terms on which finance is available. In that 
situation, any gap that opens up between the marginal return and the cost of funds needs to be 
explained as a choice variable for the firm itself. This shifts the focus to the literature on possible 
overinvestment or underinvestment by firms. The latter relates to cases where target marginal 
returns (the hurdle rate) fall below the cost of funds and the former deals with the case where a 
reluctance to invest results in a hurdle rate higher than the cost of funds. 
 
It has not been easy to test the relative incidence of over or under-investment, partly because of 
the difficulties in establishing counterfactuals and partly because behaviour may be context-
specific e.g. financialisation may have increased the pressure on firms to rein in investment 
(Driver and Shepherd 2005). Aggarwal and Samwick (2006). interpret a positive co-movement of 
investment and performance in response to stronger incentives as evidence against 
overinvestment. While this is consistent with much of the literature, it seems likely that both 
behaviours co-exist (Stein 2003). Although it is possible to make heroic attempts to nest various 
theories of over and under-investment (see Hennessy and Levy 2002), the results are then very 
dependent on the specification chosen for managerial incentives and compensation.5 
 
Historically, overinvestment has had the largest share of attention. An important aspect of 
agency theory is the ‘empire-building hypothesis’ where managers or owner-managers pursue 
size or growth as a distinct objective (Baumol 1958; Marris 1964). Discretionary behaviour by 
                                                           
4
 For a review of financial constraint on investment see Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2003). The distortion introduced 
by financial constraint is not, however, clear-cut because risk-loving behaviour may emerge under financial distress 
(Opler and Titman 1994).  
5
 Indeeed, this is the source of the conflicting claims in respect of the importance of empire building in Aggarwal and 
Samwick (2006) and Hennessy and Levy (2002).  
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management (in situations of both weak corporate governance and product market discipline) 
has been formalized in the literature as an optimal trade-off between the utility attached to 
growth and the risks of takeover (Odagiri 1981).  In this model, managers derive utility from job 
security which is thus the source of an agency problem.  If *v  is the value of the firm under profit 
maximisation (where the marginal product of capital is equal to the discount rate), actual firm 
value v can be written as a function of the level of investment and of the permanent free cash 
flow ( F ) available to the firm, discounted at some suitable rate r .  The discrepancy between 
maximal and actual value is then  rIFvv /)(* −−=∂   The probability of a take-over can now 
be written as )( vp ∂ with 0)( >∂′ vp .  Since managers also derive empire benefits from growth, 
they have to trade that off against the risk to job security from non-profit maximizing behaviour 
and that may be captured by a utility function )](),([ vpIgUU ∂= .  Maximising U  with respect 
to I  yields a first order condition that ensures, under fairly unrestrictive conditions, that the 
marginal product of capital for the firm lies below the discount rate, indicating managerial caution 
or constraint (Kathuria and Mueller 1995). 
 
 
 
Underinvestment can also be explained by agency theories e.g. theories that predict managerial 
“shirking”, short-termism, or unwillingness to take risks. A parallel view characterizes 
underinvestment as a performance consequence of business school pedagogy, particularly in 
respect of formal investment appraisal methods such as NPV, with the accounting and finance 
function within firms privileged over strategy and operational management (Hayes and Garvin 
1982; Adler 2006). To some extent, real options theory can then be seen as a way for strategists 
to defend investments that would otherwise fail on strict NPV terms.   Thus, for example, if a 
project has an expected negative NPV but nevertheless offers the prospect of subsequently 
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entering a new market which may be highly profitable, it could be justified on real options 
grounds. This is the case even if the second project as of the date of commencement of the first 
seems just as likely to lose money as the first one. The key element in justifying the first 
investment is that it offers the opportunity but not the requirement of participating in the second 
i.e. it offers the upside potential without the downside risks.6 These so-called “follow-on” 
investments may be particularly important in cases of new markets and new product innovations 
where there are clear first mover advantages. In recognition of this, lower hurdle rates may be 
allocated to such lines of business. 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, however, while justifying positive investment when expected returns 
are negative, real options theory can also justify delaying investment when expected returns are 
positive. Indeed this is the standard case explained in most elementary treatments of real 
options where information is gained by delay and where delay is possible because the option 
(e.g. a patent or undeveloped land) will not be eroded by waiting.  In these circumstances it 
makes sense to judge the moment to invest (exercise the option) as that which balances the 
cost of maintaining the option against the dangers of premature commitment to an irreversible 
outcome. Firms face a ‘zone of inaction’ in respect of the marginal value of capital, where it is 
optimal to keep the capital stock constant even if it differs from its frictionless optimal value.7   
Here the irreversibility premium arises from the modification to the equilibrium condition for 
capital adjustment with marginal cost of adjustment CI, which includes the purchase and 
installation price, as well as true adjustment costs. A perturbation argument ensures that the firm 
is indifferent between an increase in capital in by one unit in period t and a decrease in period 
t+1 with subsequent periods unaffected. Of course present adjustment costs have to reflect 
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 The literature shows that in a range of circumstances, such as  when abandonment is possible or where there are 
delivery lags, it may be sensible for the firm to initiate projects with negative expected return (Ghemawat 1991, Dixit 
and Pindyck 1994, Bar-Ilen and Strange 1996, Miller and Folta 2002, Schwartz and Trigeorgis 2001).  
7
 This zone of inaction may be due to non-convex costs of adjustment (Abel and Eberly 1994) or a combination of 
irreversibility and uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Chirinko and Schaller 2002; Folta et al 2005). 
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interest and depreciation, but that is balanced by the marginal return on capital (piK ). We thus 
obtain (Romer 2000; Chirinko and Schaller 2001) 
 
        
The expectation of CI for the next period however must take account of the irreversibility of 
investment. This is because firms cannot adjust smoothly in the presence of either fixed 
adjustment costs of uncertainty with irreversible. If the firm anticipates disinvestment at the 
distress price, it would imply a hurdle rate above the cost of capital. 8 
 
These opposing effects on investment from the real options literature have spawned an 
immense set of applied studies most of which focus on a single type of option. Hybrid theories of 
real options are of course possible, as when a firm is simultaneously faced with deciding on 
projects with multiple conflicting characteristics. For example, a project may be irreversible and 
at the same time convey an option to expand. In these circumstances it is the balance between 
the option effects that is important (Folta and O Brien 2004; Kulatilaka and Perotti  1998; Driver 
et al 2006). 
 
Formulating Hypotheses 
Distortions to standard rules of investment appraisal may arise due to the agency-inspired 
theories of empire building and managerial shirking or, via the ambiguous effects of real options. 
We combine the various elements of theory reviewed above to derive testable hypothesis. As 
there may be hybrid influences, we try to identify circumstances where it is most likely that the 
                                                           
8
 Rules of thumb for hurdle rates in excess of the discount rate are derived from real options theory in McDonald 
(2000). 
 
][)1( 1,,, ++=++ tItKtI CECr piδ
 9
critical marginal return set by managers (the hurdle rate) is above or below the cost of funds (the 
discount rate).9 Our discussion to date suggests three main hypotheses: 
H1:  There will be a higher likelihood of observing hurdle rates below discount rates when 
managers have discretionary power 
 
However, it is important to note that the existence of discretionary power need not imply “over-
investment”.  To consider this we need to test: 
 
H2: There will be a higher likelihood of observing hurdle rates below discount rates when 
managers experience strategic incentives.  
 
Note that if H1 is true but not H2, then this indicates Jensen type “over-investment”. If both are 
true, the low hurdle rate may be explained by managers pursuing strategic objectives.  
 
For the third hypothesis we consider reasons for lower investment than would be warranted by a 
simple application of NPV: 
 
H3: There will  be a higher likelihood of observing hurdle rates above discount rates when 
managers are either shirking or, are profit-maximising but subject to an irreversibility constraint, 
implying the importance of idiosyncratic risk and irreversibility. 
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 Our set of theories is not exhaustive and is chosen to correspond with our unique set of data. Other complex 
influences have been noted in the literature as where capital rationing is used to substitute for auditing and 
monitoring (Antle and Eppen 1985) or to prevent over-investment caused by managers signalling their performance 
(Holmstrom and Costa 1986). Related literature investigates how variables such as audit costs or the specific nature 
of empire benefits might influence overinvestment (Harris and Raviv 1996; Baldenius 2003), how agency problems 
and real options interact (Grenadier and Wang 2004, Friedl 2005), or how rationing may elicit private information 
from managers (Qi Chen and Wen Jiang 2004). Complications also arise when options are held under rivalrous 
conditions (Schwartz and Trigeorgis 2001). Furthermore non-unique equilibrium outcomes are obtained when entry 
is rivalrous and where real options effects may interact with the distribution of  firms’ costs (Pawlina and Kort 2006).   
Empirical testing of these models would require additional matched data. 
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One point that needs clarification is the extent to which the hurdle rate is set by the division (or 
line of business) or is set centrally and imposed on the division. Previous work on capital 
budgeting and allocation has shown these to be interactive processes between divisions and 
headquarters …”division managers are granted some discretion over capital expenditures and 
they share their special knowledge with headquarters” (Taggart, 1987 p.188). It is possible that 
the location of the decision on hurdle rates has little consequence for the analysis in this paper in 
that any set of influences (agency or real options) that would be present for division managers 
may well also be reflected at headquarters. But even if that is not the case, the “hurdle” rates 
recorded in our data i.e. the required rate of return the divisional managers use in planning new 
investment, are unlikely to be unilaterally dictated by headquarters. Large corporations find it 
difficult to micromanage their divisions so there is probably a degree of strategic autonomy in 
relation to investment planning. Wulf (2002) in an extensive empirical appraisal notes that 
”…there is rent seeking behaviour by division managers …they have an incentive to engage in 
influence activities and distort subjective information about investment opportunities” (p.2) There 
is thus leeway for division managers to pursue distinct interests as when, for example 
opportunities for promotion are increased through growth strategies (Odagiri 1992).  
 
We now briefly describe the data set used to test the three hypotheses above H1-H3. 
 
3. The PIMS Dataset 
 
The data source used in this paper is the PIMS (Profit Impact of Marketing Strategy) cross-
sectional database of large firms, established in 1972 at Harvard University. The reporting base 
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consists of over 3000 business units mainly based in the US - representing 450 companies – 
and which are considered to be selling a ‘distinct set of products to a well-defined set of 
customers’, therefore corresponding to narrow market segments which are at least as fine as the 
four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC).The PIMS program is described in detail in 
Buzzell and Gale (1987).  The data have been extensively used in applied research (e.g. Clark 
and Griliches 1984, Ghemawat and Caves 1986, Caves and Ghemawat 1992). The data are 
prepared by managers of each business unit under detailed guidance from PIMS consultants. 
The sample period for the cross section covers 1972 to 1992 with the data being collected in 
five-year blocks.10 Firms subscribe to PIMS as a way of benchmarking performance in different 
businesses; a digest of the results in ratio form is returned to firms to allow them to compare 
indicators such as R&D intensity, capacity utilization, or profitability. Data that are not in ratio 
form are disguised by being scaled using a constant term specific to each business unit. Of 
course these data have all the virtues and shortcomings of any survey-based sample; they are 
direct and consistent in that all variables are collected from the same source. On the other hand, 
they are only as reliable as the reporting managers choose to be.  However, when used in 
applied work, the data have underpinned a number of interesting analyses (Roberts 2003, 
Buzzell 2004). Furthermore, as the ensuing discussion on the interpretation of hurdle rates and 
discount rates makes clear, considerable effort was expended in making the questions clear to 
the respondents.     
 
Most of the variables used in the following analysis are reasonably self-explanatory and are 
listed and annotated in the Data Appendix.  However, we give here the actual PIMS definitions 
of the terms ‘hurdle rate’ and ‘discount rate’, for which the specific instructions relating to their 
reporting were: 
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 If there are multiple blocks for any business unit, the latest block only is recorded in the sample. 
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Discount rate: “The discount rate is used in computing the present value of a stream of future 
income or cash flow. You can think of it also as your opportunity cost of capital (i.e. your 
company’s cost of debt and equity)” 
 
Capital Charge Rate: “In calculating discounted net income what capital-charge rate should be 
applied to any additional investment that would be required to pursue the various strategy 
alternatives available to your business? The capital charge rate can be used to simulate 
financing costs for new investment” 
 
PIMS tells its respondents that “the discount rate indicates the degree to which current income 
or cash flow is more valuable than future income or cash flow”, i.e. it is a conventionally defined 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Similarly, the capital charge rate “indicates the degree 
to which your business should be encouraged to seek (or be penalized for seeking) additional 
investment funds”. It is clear therefore that the capital charge rate is indeed a “hurdle rate”11 
 
Key descriptive statistics of our dataset are reported in the Data Appendix below. In our data 
2382 business units reported both hurdle rates (our variable identifier below is HR) and discount 
rates (DR). Of these 1425 over half reported that they used hurdle rates that were equal to their 
discount rates, though we interpret this to be “approximately equal” due to the preponderance of 
rates given to the nearest 5% which is probably due to the guidance given by PIMS consultants . 
We refer to these units as the ‘EQUAL’ sample). Of the remaining units, 505 units reported using 
hurdle rates less than the discount rate (the ‘BELOW’ sample), with the remaining 452 units 
reporting hurdle rates above the discount rate (the ‘ABOVE’ sample).    
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 These interpretations of the discount rate and hurdle rate were confirmed by PIMS in private correspondence. Note 
that we are only using the representaitve “hurdle rate” recorded in the survey. In defence of our approach, the 
analysis is done at the line of business level where there will be less scope for multiple rates. Furthermore, the 
recorded rate is representative, given that it is identified by managers in discussion with  PIMS consultants.  Hurdle 
rates may also change over time but we have chosen a single time block (the latest available) for each line of 
business and controlled for the time period by using the discount rate as a control (see text for estimation methods). 
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4. Empirical Testing 
Under hypotheses H1 and H2, described in section 2, the case where the hurdle rate is lower 
than the discount rate (the BELOW sample) is predicted by the opportunity to engage in empire 
building and by the existence of real follow-on options. By contrast, under H3, the ABOVE 
sample, is predicted by a reluctance to invest – perhaps due to managerial shirking – or a 
combination of risk and irreversibility (deferment options). For emphasis we set this out below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SAMPLE 
OBSERVED 
VARIABLE  
IDENTIFIER 
IMPLICATION HYPOTHESIS CONDITIONING 
VARIABLES 
 
Hurdle<Discount 
(HR)      (DR) 
BELOW Managerial/ 
Strategic Behavior 
H1/H2 Opportunity for 
Empire Building 
(OEB)/ 
OEB and 
Existence of follow-
on options 
 
Hurdle>Discount 
(HR)       (DR) 
 
ABOVE 
 
Profit Maximizing 
with Irreversibility 
 
H3 
 
Risk and 
Irreversibility 
implying deferment 
options; Shirking 
 
 
Variables that help identify the BELOW group  
Not all firms are in a position to maintain (long-run) investments at hurdle rates lower than the 
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discount rate. The corporate governance literature suggests that, in the presence of asymmetric 
information, a necessary condition for such opportunity is the existence of free cash flow 
(Jensen 1986; Henderson and Cool 2003). Managerial autonomy may also be constrained in 
ways other than the availability of internal finance. A number of authors have noted that product 
market competition is important in disciplining managers. In that respect, competition in product 
markets (from end-users and competitors) substitutes for direct monitoring by shareholders or 
their representatives and makes the latter less costly (Allen and Gale 2000; Gillan 2006).12 
Proxies for limitation on managerial discretion available to us from the PIMS dataset and 
employed in this study were as follows (further information on variables can be found in the Data 
Appendix): 
 
• Liquidity:  a ranking of business units according to the ratio of cash-flow to sales [ LIQ]  
• Lack of market discipline expressed as the % of sales channeled to distribution facility [SDF] 
• Inverse lack of market discipline  expressed as  the % of sales channeled to retailer [SR] 
• Existence of a barrier to entry expressed as  “capacity quantum” or degree of lumpy capital -  
[LUMP] 
• Existence of a barrier to entry expressed as capital intensity, the ratio of fixed capital to sales 
[KS] 
 
Variables that help identify the ABOVE group  
Real Follow-On Options 
The incentive to pursue growth should be related to the strategic value of investments. Here we 
use a variable recording the percentage of sales accounted for by new products so as to capture 
the innovativeness of the business unit and therefore the value of follow-on options. This 
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 A number of subtle effects may mediate the effect of competition on performance. For example competition may 
enhance the ease with which managerial performance can be compared  (Nickell 1995) 
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variable may be preferable to variables such as R&D to sales ratio where the intensity is known 
to depend on sector characteristics that favour certain types of technical innovativeness. 
 
 
Opportunities for Managerial Shirking 
The opportunity to shirk will be influenced by some of the same variables that influence empire 
building in the BELOW group. We also include here other indicators of the competitive 
environment which may limit the opportunity to shirk.  Given that major entry generally disrupts 
the quiet life scenario, companies have to choose between an accommodating response which 
results in ceding market share or an aggressive response to maintain position. Either response 
is possible depending on the nature of the strategic game, but much of the literature suggests 
that new entry stimulates incumbents to increase investment that firms have been holding 
back.13 This implies that previous major entry will predict against current membership of the 
ABOVE group.  
 
 Accordingly, the specific extra variables included are: 
 
• % sales from new products [SNP ] 
• major entry  [ENT ] 
 
Risk factors 
Risk should already be accounted for as part of the discount rate in so far as it reflects the equity 
risk premium but total risk may also be important (Stulz 1999). Survey research shows that 
demand (sales) risk is of primary concern to firm managers (Driver and Whelan 2001). Hence 
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 See Geroski (1995) for a review and especially p.1431 Note that major new entry is independent of the barriers to 
entry variables discussed earlier in that new entry relates to the entry in the “past three years”. 
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we include a measure of the industry sales volatility provided in PIMS: 
 
• Industry instability [INSTAB] 
 
Statistical summaries of these variables for each of the outcomes and the total sample are 
reported in the Appendix.  
 
Clearly we could encounter hybrid cases where the variables indicating membership of the 
BELOW and ABOVE groups are jointly operative. However, as long as this is borne in mind, the 
dichotomy remains useful as a potential source of heterogeneity across firms.  In the empirical 
analysis that follows, we use a multinomial logit analysis to differentiate the between the 
ABOVE, EQUAL and BELOW outcomes, conditioning on the opportunity, and on the incentive, 
to act strategically, as well as on measures of risk and irreversibility.  
 
 
 
5. Estimation and Results 
 
This section reports experiments with discrete choice models in which we consider all three 
outcomes in the observed relationship between the hurdle rate and the discount rate –   
BELOW,  EQUAL, or ABOVE  - as being conditioned on our measures of opportunity and 
incentive as discussed in the last section.14 Moreover, while there is an ordering of outcomes 
suggests that the ordered logit estimator may be appropriate, our earlier discussion also 
suggests that rather different factors may explain membership of the different groups and that 
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 As noted earlier while in theory we have continuous data, the tendency for answers to be to the nearest 5% adds 
another reason for our chosen estimation method. 
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some variables may therefore have an ambiguous impact, making the use of an ordered logit 
less appropriate than a multinomial logit. Specifically variables that predict membership of the 
BELOW group may not be hypothesized to predict against membership of the ABOVE group. 
This is quite likely in our sample where a variable may be proxying for different influences on 
these groups, as discussed later in regard to the results for the product innovation variable 
(SNP). Thus, we use the following multinomial logit model:  
 
Pr (Yi  =  j) =  exp ( X i β j ) / (Σj (exp ( X i β j ) ) 
j = 1, 2, 3 (BELOW, EQUAL, ABOVE)  
 i = 1,…,N  
 
Where   X i  = (LIQi, SDFi, SRi , LUMPi , KSi , SNPi, ENTi, INSTABi )   
and β
 j  is a set of constants for each of the three outcomes.  
 
The key feature of the multinomial logit estimator for our purposes is that it allows the estimated 
set of coefficients β to vary between outcomes. However as the probabilities sum to one, 
identification of β
 j  requires that one of the sets of coefficients arbitrarily be set to zero. In our 
reported results in Table 1, ‘EQUAL’ is used as the comparator group (i.e.  β
 2 = 0).  
 
{TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE} 
 
Table 1 reports the results of four experiments. The first result set (1.1) records coefficient 
estimates for the base line specification which includes each of the variables discussed in the 
last section. The second set of estimates (1.2) includes an additional regressor (LIQSQ) – the 
square of the cash-flow term (LIQ) to allow for a possible non-linear effect of cash-flow. The third 
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result set (1.3) omits one of the regressors – our measure of risk (INSTAB) - the inclusion of 
which affects the sample size, while the fourth (1.4) restricts the sample to manufacturing.  
 
All the variables discussed earlier are found to be significant or very significant in distinguishing 
the BELOW from the EQUAL group and thus hypotheses H1 and H2 are both supported. The 
results for the ABOVE group show that the variables for managerial motivation contribute 
significantly to discriminating between this group and the EQUAL group. Comparing 1.1 and 1.2, 
we found that the inclusion of the cash-flow squared term in the latter (LIQSQ) generally 
improved the diagnostics but had little impact on the reported signs of the other variables. Result 
set 1.2 therefore provides our preferred set of estimates in the discussion below.  The final 
experiments - 1.3 and 1.4 - provide robustness checks by changing the sample.  As our 
measure of risk is not recorded for a substantial number of business units, 1.3 increases the 
sample size (from 1514 to 2263) by dropping our risk measure (INSTAB). Most of the 
coefficients remain stable in terms of sign and significance, although our market share indicator 
(MSR), which may be proxying for a price elasticity effect on expansion, is now insignificant for 
both groups. In the final experiment (1.4), the sample is restricted to the units known to be in 
manufacturing industry. The results here are similar to 1.2 though the sample size has been 
reduced by a third. It is, perhaps, of interest that the effect of the risk variable INSTAB is greater 
in magnitude and significance for this set of results, particularly for the BELOW group, in line 
with expectation that sunk cost might be more important in this sector.15 Further results for 
experiments 1.1 and 1.2 are reported in Table A3 of the Appendix. They also suggest that 1.2 
should be the preferred result, and that neither the Hausman or Small-Hsiao tests that the 
estimated probabilities between outcomes are independent of the omitted alternative can be 
rejected.    
                                                           
15
 Manufacturing business units are also likely to be larger than service ones, so the results are also in line with 
findings in Ghosal and Loungani (2000). 
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In order to comment on the results in detail, the marginal probabilities need to be computed. 
These have been derived from our preferred result set 1.2 and are reported in Table 2 in the 
form of the estimated change in probability for each outcome arising from a unit change for the 
variable in question. The marginal probabilities are evaluated at the means of the variables, 
except in the case of the dummy variable representing major entry, which was evaluated at zero 
(i.e. with no major entry).  
 
{TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE} 
 
The results in Table 2 provide very strong evidence for the importance of the opportunity set in 
distinguishing the BELOW outcome from the EQUAL outcome. Importantly, cash flow (LIQ) 
appears to facilitate managerial or strategic behavior. Although the cash flow term is non-linear, 
the overall impact of an increase in cash-flow is nonetheless positive in predicting membership 
of the BELOW group. Other opportunity set variables include indicators of market discipline, of 
which the most important influences are the variables representing customer power.  For the 
BELOW outcome, both the % of sales channeled to a retailer (SR) and the % channeled to own 
distribution (SDF) facilities are significant and signed in accordance with expectation. The other 
opportunity variables representing barriers to entry also predict membership of the BELOW 
group, all with the anticipated sign and significant (at 5% for the capital-sales ratio – KS - and at 
the 1% level for capacity quantum - LUMP).   Moreover, although the impact of cash flow is 
predominant, the estimated impacts of at least some of the other variables are also reasonably 
large.  This can be seen from Figure 1, where the marginal probability of each variable is 
multiplied by its respective standard deviation.   
 
{FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE} 
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Figure 2 plots the marginal probabilities of the different outcomes of a one percentage point 
improvement in cash-flow at different levels of cash-flow. The estimated impact of a movement 
to a higher percentile in the cash-flow ranking is to increase the probability of a BELOW outcome 
by slightly less than 0.006 for the poorest units in terms of cash-flow (at the 10th percentile). This 
probability rises to about 0.01 at its peak around the 40-50th percentile before trailing off to below 
0.006 for the cash rich units at the 90th percentile.   
 
{FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE} 
 
Turning now to the set of variables representing strategic incentives, support can be found in 
Table 2 for this as set out under Hypothesis 2. A noteworthy feature of the results – and which 
lends support to our choices of the multinomial logit estimator - is that the sign of the new 
product variable (SNP) is positive and significant for both the BELOW and the ABOVE groups 
suggesting that product innovation encourages strategic investment for some business units and 
discourages it for others. This heterogeneity, which the multinomial logit technique is designed to 
capture, probably reflects different approaches by different managers as suggested in our 
introductory comments.  On the one hand, new product intensity may confer an option to expand 
that justifies strategic loss-making pilot investments (Folta and O’Brien 2003), and therefore 
membership of the BELOW group. On the other hand, new product intensity is also likely to be 
associated with divisions that attract attention and monitoring from Head Office. These business 
units may find that they have a higher hurdle rate imposed on them than a company-wide cost of 
capital so that new product intensity also predicts an ABOVE outcome.   
 
A second variable representing a possible strategic incentive is the occurrence of major new 
entry (ENT). The results suggest that new entry favors the chance of a firm being in the  
 21
EQUAL group and reduces the chance of a firm being in the ABOVE group.  Entry appears to 
produce an aggressive response from companies that have previously had a conservative 
investment position..   
 
The final set of discriminating variables concerns hypothesis 3 (H3) - that non-diversified risk i.e. 
risk not accounted for in the discount rate - may influence hurdle rates via the role of an 
irreversibility constraint (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Risk is measured by instability in the industry 
growth rate (INSTAB). This variable predicts against a BELOW outcome (at 10%) and, also, for 
membership of the ABOVE group (significant at the 5% level). This provides some evidence that 
an additional influence from risk does bias hurdle rates upward. Figure 1 shows that its 
quantitative impact, while small, is not negligible.   
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have looked at the relationship between hurdle rates and discount rates in order 
to understand the influence of a range of firm characteristics on investment appraisal. The first 
important finding is that there are a significant number of firms in our data which report hurdle 
rates below discount rates (the BELOW group which accounts for well over one fifth of the total 
sample). We argued that this may be explained by the presence of opportunities presented by 
strong cash flow and the absence of competitive market pressures, resulting in either agency 
costs which take the form of managerialist empire building or - as suggested by the real options 
literature - the pursuit of strategic objectives.   
 
A second finding was that our data also contained a substantial number of observations where 
managers reported hurdle rates above the discount rate (the ABOVE group comprising roughly 
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one fifth of the total). Here, the real options approach emphasizes the role played by 
irreversibility and uncertainty, generating a ‘zone of inaction’ for investment projects.  
 
Given the theoretical background, our analysis focuses on: the opportunity for discretionary 
behaviour; the motivation or incentives to behave in a strategic fashion; as well as the risk of the 
business environment. These sets of influences are hypothesized to affect the likelihood that the 
hurdle rate will be greater than or less than the discount rate. The theoretical analysis suggests 
a multinomial logit analysis despite an apparent ordering of the groups, because some variables 
may have an asymmetric effect.  
 
As both Table 2 and Figure 1 attest, the results are rather stronger in discriminating between the 
BELOW and EQUAL outcomes than between the ABOVE and EQUAL groups. Nevertheless, 
both sets of results give rise to interesting interpretations. 
 
Focusing first on the variables that contribute most to distinguishing firms that adopt hurdles 
lower than the discount rate we identified a set of ‘opportunity’ variables, specifically cash flow 
and the environment for product market competition. These results (in Table 2) give support to 
the arguments in the literature that emphasize the tendency for managerially driven ‘over-
investment’ when strong market or other disciplines on management are absent. Though we 
have no direct variable for corporate governance, these results also support the view that the 
market environment (competitive pressure) substitutes for tight group oversight.  However, as 
noted in the text, the significance of the opportunity variables is not a sufficient condition to 
identify behaviour. Managers may be using their freedom from short-term pressures to pursue 
strategic long-run aims (Stein 2003, p.131). To test this, we entered a number of other variables 
representing the incentive for strategic investment, in particular new product intensity. In the 
case of the first of these variables we again found a strong discriminating role, suggesting that 
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managers are strategically focused when presented with greater autonomy. This is in keeping 
with much recent theoretical work on real follow-on options. High levels of risk also worked to 
discriminate against firms choosing hurdles less than the discount rate. 
 
For the sample of firms with hurdles greater than their discount rate, the results suggest that 
rather different influences are at work. First there is the lack of significance for the opportunity 
variables other than cash flow - where the magnitude of the response is also small -  so that 
increases in cash flow were estimated to have little effect on the probability of observing a 
member of the ABOVE group.  The recent entry of a major competitor also appears to be 
important in lowering the probability of observing hurdle rates higher than the discount rate. This 
latter finding could plausibly be explained in terms of a competitive effect on businesses that had 
been holding back marginally profitable developments, providing some evidence of ‘shirking’. – 
which in our context is indistinguishable from managerial short-termism. Finally we also observe 
idiosyncratic risk to be important in explaining cautionary behaviour by this group. 
 
The main message that emerges from this paper is that firms often use hurdle rates that are 
different from the cost of capital and that this observation needs to be taken seriously.  Modeling 
capital investment without accounting for this is likely to result in poor estimates. Capital 
investment theory should be broadened to include the strategic incentives of managers and the 
extent of their discretion, both of which in turn are influenced by the institutional environment.  
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DATA AND RESULTS APPENDIX 
 
Variables and 
Descriptions 
 
Variable Identifier Description 
Cash-flow sales rank   LIQ Free cash flow expressed as a ratio of sales and ranked inversely (1=lowest) 
 
Cash-flow sales 
squared/10000 
 
LIQSQ 
 
As above, squared 
 
% sales channelled 
to distribution facility  
 
SDF 
 
% of sales made to company-owned distribution facilities 
 
% sales channelled 
to retailer  
 
SR 
 
% of sales made to retailers 
 
Capacity quantum  
 
LUMP 
 
This is defined in the survey as the “minimum economically efficient amount” 
by which the standard capacity of the business could be increased, expressed 
as a percentage of the previous years capacity. 
 
Ratio of fixed capital 
to sales  
 
 
KS 
 
Gross book value of plant and equipment as a percentage of sales 
% sales from new 
products  
SNP Percentage of sales accounted for by products introduced in the last five years 
 
Major entry  
 
ENT 
 
Entry is  major if it accounts for 5% of sales and has taken place within 3 years 
 
Industry instability  
 
INSTAB 
 
RMSE index of industry sales instability over five years 
 
Discount rate  
 
DR 
 
See definition in text 
 
Hurdle rate  
 
HS 
 
See definition in text 
 
Proprietary 
Processes 
 
  PROP  
 
Dummy=1 if process is protected to a significant degree by patent, trade 
secrets or other proprietary methods 
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TABLE  A1 
 
Correlation Matrix for Variables Used –  
Total Sample 
       
              
LIQ LIQSQ SDF SR LUMP KS SNP ENT MSR INSTAB DR HR
Cash-flow sales ( LIQ ) 1.000
Cash-flow sales squared ( LIQSQ ) 0.969 1.000
% sales channelled to distribution 
facility (SDF )
-0.012 -0.010 1.000
% sales channelled to retailer ( SR )
-0.052 -0.068 -0.030 1.000
Capacity quantum ( LUMP )
-0.035 -0.019 0.013 -0.043 1.000
Ratio of fixed capital to sales ( KS )
-0.127 -0.081 -0.034 -0.126 0.067 1.000
% sales from new products ( SNP )
-0.181 -0.147 0.040 0.012 0.058 -0.091 1.000
Major entry ( ENT ) 0.012 0.029 0.009 -0.060 0.024 -0.037 0.098 1.000
Industry instability ( INSTAB ) 0.041 0.043 -0.023 0.000 -0.012 0.019 0.024 0.001 0.019 1.000
Discount rate ( DR ) 0.043 0.045 -0.018 -0.012 0.057 -0.022 -0.020 -0.007 -0.059 -0.045 1.000
Hurdle Rate ( HR ) -0.030 -0.019 -0.029 0.035 -0.004 -0.071 -0.001 0.012 -0.035 0.025 0.474 1.000
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TABLE A2 
 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Total Sample 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cash-flow sales ( LIQ ) 2382 50.0 28.9 0.1 100.0
Cash-flow sales squared ( LIQSQ ) 2382 3335.4 2983.2 0.0 10000.0
% sales channelled to distribution 
facility (SDF ) 2377 4.6 15.2 0.0 100.0
% sales channelled to retailer ( SR ) 2377 18.5 32.2 0.0 100.0
Capacity quantum ( LUMP ) 2308 17.5 21.6 0.0 100.0
Ratio of fixed capital to sales ( KS ) 2382 45.2 32.8 3.0 170.0
% sales from new products ( SNP ) 2351 7.8 15.2 0.0 99.0
Major entry ( ENT ) 2368 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0
Market share rank ( MSR ) 2382 2.6 2.1 1.0 10.0
Industry instability ( INSTAB ) 1578 11.4 9.6 0.0 40.0
Discount rate ( DR ) 2382 11.7 3.0 2.0 20.0
Hurdle Rate ( HR ) 2382 11.5 3.0 4.0 20.0
 
 
 
SAMPLE = BELOW
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cash-flow sales ( LIQ ) 505 52.3 27.4 0.6 99.7
Cash-flow sales squared ( LIQSQ ) 505 3481.0 2890.4 0.4 9949.7
% sales channelled to distribution 
facility (SDF ) 504 6.1 17.7 0.0 100.0
% sales channelled to retailer ( SR ) 504 14.4 27.9 0.0 100.0
Capacity quantum ( LUMP ) 499 19.3 22.0 0.0 100.0
Ratio of fixed capital to sales ( KS ) 505 47.2 32.7 3.0 170.0
% sales from new products ( SNP ) 502 8.5 16.5 0.0 90.8
Major entry ( ENT ) 504 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0
Industry instability ( INSTAB ) 374 10.5 8.7 0.0 40.0
Discount rate ( DR ) 505 14.0 2.7 8.0 20.0
Hurdle Rate ( HR ) 505 9.9 1.9 4.0 19.0
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SAMPLE=EQUAL
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cash-flow sales ( LIQ ) 1425.0 50.0 29.0 0.1 100.0
Cash-flow sales squared ( LIQSQ ) 1425.0 3343.7 3006.0 0.0 10000.0
% sales channelled to distribution 
facility (SDF ) 1423.0 3.9 13.8 0.0 100.0
% sales channelled to retailer ( SR ) 1423.0 19.8 33.5 0.0 100.0
Capacity quantum ( LUMP ) 1379.0 16.7 21.8 0.0 100.0
Ratio of fixed capital to sales ( KS ) 1425.0 44.2 32.4 3.0 170.0
% sales from new products ( SNP ) 1403.0 6.5 12.9 0.0 99.0
Major entry ( ENT ) 1418.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0
Industry instability ( INSTAB ) 893.0 11.5 9.7 0.0 40.0
Discount rate ( DR ) 1425.0 11.4 2.7 6.0 20.0
Hurdle Rate ( HR ) 1425.0 11.4 2.7 6.0 20.0
 
 
 
 
 
SAMPLE=ABOVE
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cash-flow sales ( LIQ ) 452 47.5 29.9 0.1 99.9
Cash-flow sales squared ( LIQSQ ) 452 3146.8 3009.6 0.0 9974.9
% sales channelled to distribution 
facility (SDF ) 450 5.1 16.5 0.0 100.0
% sales channelled to retailer ( SR ) 450 19.2 32.1 0.0 100.0
Capacity quantum ( LUMP ) 430 17.7 20.3 0.0 100.0
Ratio of fixed capital to sales ( KS ) 452 46.0 34.2 3.0 170.0
% sales from new products ( SNP ) 446 10.9 19.2 0.0 99.0
Major entry ( ENT ) 446 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0
Market share rank ( MSR ) 452 2.7 2.2 1.0 10.0
Industry instability ( INSTAB ) 311 12.2 10.4 0.0 40.0
Discount rate ( DR ) 452 10.0 2.7 2.0 18.0
Hurdle Rate ( HR ) 452 13.3 3.6 5.0 20.0
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TABLE A3 
 
 
 
Additional Statistics for result sets 1.1 and 1.2
Result Set (see table 1) 1.1 1.2
McFaddens adjusted R2 0.013 0.017
Cragg and Uhler's R2 0.049 0.059
Adjusted Count R2 0.011 0.005
LR test of 1.1 against 1.2 P>chi2 0.000
Hausman Test of IIA ssumption
H0: odds of pairs of outcome are independent of other 
alternatives
omitted outcome
BELOW 0.975 1
ABOVE 1 1
Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption
H0: odds of pairs of outcome are independent of other 
alternatives
omitted outcome:
BELOW 0.500 0.085
ABOVE 0.177 0.229
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TABLE 1
Results from Multinomial Logit Estimation
Result Set (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) exc. INSTAB (1.4) Manufacturing  
Comparison group is EQUAL Coeff. z Sig Coeff. z Sig Coeff. z Sig Coeff. z Sig
Outcome = BELOW
Managerial Opportunity
Cash-flow sales (LIQ) 0.0047 2.16 ** 0.0404 4.38 *** 0.0287 3.66 *** 0.0446 4.03 ***
Cash-flow sales squared (LIQSQ)
- - -0.0003 -3.95 *** -0.0002 -3.29 *** -0.0004 -3.72 ***
% sales channelled to distribution facility 
(SDF) 0.0084 2.04 ** 0.0086 2.12 ** 0.0071 2.17 ** 0.0137 2.71 ***
% sales channelled to retailer (SR)
-0.0052 -2.36 ** -0.0056 -2.55 ** -0.0055 -3.11 *** -0.0023 -0.90
Capacity quantum (LUMP) 0.0078 2.65 *** 0.0083 2.74 *** 0.0051 2.17 ** 0.0103 3.03 ***
Ratio of fixed capital to sales (KS) 0.0044 2.31 ** 0.0060 3.00 *** 0.0032 1.92 * 0.0058 2.56 ***
Managerial Motivation
% sales from new products (SNP) 0.0132 3.04 *** 0.0153 3.46 *** 0.0160 4.21 *** 0.0230 4.30 ***
Major entry (ENT)
-0.4081 -2.72 *** -0.3757 -2.49 ** -0.4140 -3.25 *** -0.4821 -2.61 ***
Risk
Industry instability (INSTAB)
-0.0137 -1.97 ** -0.0138 -1.96 ** - - -0.0218 -2.63 ***
-2.0915 -6.12 ***
Constant
-1.2368 -6.05 *** -1.9751 -7.11 *** -1.8318 -8.24 *** -2.0915 -6.12 ***
Outcome = ABOVE
Managerial Opportunity
Cash-flow sales (LIQ)
-0.0035 -1.42 0.0030 0.30 -0.0059 -0.73 0.0017 0.14
Cash-flow sales squared (LIQSQ)
- - -0.0001 -0.64 0.0000 0.54 -0.0001 -0.45
% sales channelled to distribution facility 
(SDF) -0.0004 -0.08 -0.0004 -0.07 0.0044 1.15 -0.0045 -0.46
% sales channelled to retailer (SR)
-0.0005 -0.24 -0.0006 -0.27 -0.0010 -0.58 0.0025 0.92
Capacity quantum (LUMP) 0.0021 0.62 0.0022 0.65 0.0010 0.40 -0.0015 -0.36
Ratio of fixed capital to sales (KS) 0.0036 1.64 0.0038 1.71 * 0.0022 1.16 0.0031 1.14
Managerial Motivation
% sales from new products (SNP) 0.0187 4.60 *** 0.0191 4.63 *** 0.0207 5.81 *** 0.0223 4.30 ***
Major entry (ENT)
-0.4697 -2.83 *** -0.4656 -2.81 *** -0.4415 -3.22 *** -0.3911 -2.00 **
Risk
Industry instability (INSTAB) 0.0099 1.42 0.0099 1.42 - - 0.0125 1.63
Constant
-1.2628 -5.75 *** -1.3941 -4.84 *** -1.2019 -5.24 *** -1.4349 -4.01 ***
No of  Obs 1514 1514 2263 1099
Wald Test chi2(16) 73.26 chi2(18) 90.99 chi2(16) 94.02 chi2(18) 81.67
Pr (> chi2) 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
Pseudo R2 0.0255 0.0307 0.0223 0.042
* = significant at 10%
** = significant at 5%
*** = significant at 1%
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TABLE 2
Marginal Probabilities: 
The impact on probabilities for each outcome of a unit change in the stated variable
Based on Table 1 result set 1.2
BELOW OUTCOME EQUAL OUTCOME ABOVE OUTCOME
evaluated at:
marginal 
probability z sig evaluated at:
marginal 
probability z sig evaluated at:
marginal 
probability z sig
Managerial Opportunity
Cash-flow sales (LIQ) mean 0.0084 4.01 *** mean -0.0064 -3.31 *** mean -0.0020 -1.39
Cash-flow sales squared (LIQSQ) - -0.0001 -3.54 *** - 0.0001 3.16 *** - 0.0000 0.79
% sales channelled to distribution facility 
(SDF) mean 0.0019 2.24 ** mean -0.0013 -1.33 mean -0.0006 -0.69
% sales channelled to retailer (SR) mean -0.0012 -2.54 ** mean 0.0009 2.07 ** mean 0.0002 0.73
Capacity quantum (LUMP) mean 0.0016 2.72 *** mean -0.0015 -2.25 ** mean -0.0002 -0.31
Ratio of fixed capital to sales (KS) mean 0.0010 2.51 ** mean -0.0013 -3.06 *** mean 0.0002 0.72
Managerial Motivation
% sales from new products (SNP) mean 0.0021 2.40 ** mean -0.0042 -4.54 *** mean 0.0021 3.38 ***
Major entry (ENT) 0 -0.0531 -1.87 * 0 0.1012 3.32 *** 0 -0.0482 -2.21 **
Risk
Industry instability (INSTAB) mean -0.0035 -2.47 ** mean 0.0011 0.80 mean 0.0024 2.12 **
* = significant at 10%
** = significant at 5%
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Figure 1
Comparative Impact on Probabilities
of a Unit Change in Variables 
(Multiplied by standard deviation) 
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Figure 2
Marginal Probabilities of Outcomes at Different Percentiles of 
Cash Flow
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